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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance issues have been a growing area of management research especially among large and 
listed firms. Good corporate governance practices are regarded as important in reducing risk for investors, 
attracting investment capital and improving the performance of companies. Companies need financial resources 
and better earnings to promote their objectives. Therefore, factorsmay affect the capital structure and 
profitability of companies should be considered carefully. The purpose of the present study is to investigate 
whether there is any relationship among some specific characters of corporate governance, capital structure and 
profitability of listedHotels &Restaurant companies in Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE). To do so, 18 companies 
were selected from those which were listed inCSE during the 2007-2012. The ‘Board Composition(BC)’, ‘Board 
Size (BS)’ and ‘CEOduality (CEOD)’ were considered as independent variables, whereas,’ Debt 
Ratio(DR)’,‘Debt-to-Equity Ratio(DER)’,‘Returns on Equity(ROE)’,and ‘Return on Assets(ROA)’ as dependent 
variable. The results indicate a positive relationship between ‘BS; BC; CEOD; ROE; ROA and DERwhereas 
negative relationship between BS; BID and DR.in addition CEOD have a positive relationship with DR.In 
addition, none of the variables have a significant relationship with capital structure and profitability. 
Key words: Corporate Governance; Capital Structure and Profitability. 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a 
corporation (or company) is directed, administered or controlled. Corporate governance comprises the long-term 
management and oversight of the company in accordance with the principles of responsibility and transparency 
(OECD, 2010). 
 
Mechanisms that protect the interests of the shareholders are known as Corporate Governance mechanisms.Good 
corporate governance helps in economic development. Last two decades have seen an increasingintensity of 
research on the subject of corporate governance. Firms having weaker governance structuresface more agency 
problems and managers of those firm’s get more private benefits, due to weakgovernance structures (Core et al., 
1999). According to Chuanrommanee and Swierczek (2007), corporategovernance practices in financial 
corporations of the ASEAN countries are consistent with the internationalpractices. Corporate Governance has 
become one the important research area in Pakistan after publicationof SECP Corporate Governance Code 2002, 
for publicly listed companies. The code was met with a lot ofcriticism in the start and there was lot of difficulties 
in implementing and enforcing it. However, despite these criticisms, the Code has been the reason for the start of 
a new era of corporate governance inPakistan. Rais and Saeed (2005) argued that the acceptance of Corporate 
Governance Code has improvedoverall structure of the corporation and environment of the businesses by 
ensuring transparency andaccountability in reporting framework. Good corporate governance practices are 
important in reducing risk for investors; attracting investment capital and improving the performance of 
companies (Velnampy & Pratheepkanth, 2012) 
 
 
The main focus of this paper is to find the corporate governance practices currently practiced in Sri Lankan 
companies. And to find the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure and corporate 
governance and profitability measured by Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Debt-to-Equity 
(DER) and Debt Ratio (DR)  in Sri Lankan hotels & restaurant sector. These practices include: the size of the 
board, independence of the board and CEO status. By comparing these factors, we conclude how important it is 
for a firm to have a mix of different governance practices as they are interrelated to each other. 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY: 
The present study is envisaged with the following objectives:  
• To identify the relationship among corporate governance, capital structure and profitability in Hotel 
industries.  
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•  To find out the impact of corporate governance on capital structure and profitability. 
•  To suggest the organizations for a good governance practices for their success..  
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE: 
Corporate Governance Practices  
In general, corporate governance is considered as having significant implications for the growth prospects of an 
economy, because best practice corporate governance reduces risks for investors, attracts investment capital and 
improves the performance of companies (Spanos, 2005). In Sri Lanka, effective corporate governance is 
considered as ensuring corporate accountability, enhancing the reliability and quality of financial information, 
and therefore enhancing the integrity and efficiency of capital markets, which in turn will improve investor 
confidence (Rezaee, 2009).  
 
Cadbury (1992) defined corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. 
It is concerned with the duties and responsibilities of a company’s board of directors to successfully lead the 
company, and their relationship with its shareholders and other stakeholder groups. It is also defined as a 
“process through which shareholders induce management to act in their interests, providing a degree of investor 
confidence that is necessary for the capital markets to function effectively” (Rezaee 2009). 
 
Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka. 
Corporate governance initiatives in Sri Lanka commenced in 1997 with the introduction of a voluntary code of 
best practice on matters relating to the financial aspects of corporate governance. Voluntary codes of best 
practices on corporate governance were issued in 2003 (ICASL 2003), and in 2007 corporate governance 
standards were made mandatory for all listed companies for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 
2008. This code covered the effectiveness of the board, separation of the position of CEO and the chairman, 
appointment of the chairman, non-executive directors, professional advice, director’s training, directors 
responsibility for the presentation of financial statements, compliance reporting, internal control and committee 
structures for boards, including audit committee, and remuneration committees and nomination committees 
(Watawala,2006). The new Companies Act No. 7 was enacted in 2007 to keep abreast with prevalent 
international laws and to safeguard the interest of all stakeholders including directors, major shareholders, 
minority shareholders and creditors. The act introduced greater protection to minority shareholders, directors‟ 
duties, and transparency and accountability. The new Company Act No. 7 was based on Canadian, New Zealand 
and other modern practices. It became operative for all listed companies from 1st April 2007, and was mandatory 
from 1st April 2008.The civil war which ended in 2009 could have been expected to have had a major impact on 
economic growth. Instead, by 2007, the Sri Lankan economy recorded a growth rate of above 6 per cent for the 
third consecutive year. This raises the question: did the introduction of the corporate guidelines contribute to this 
result? If so, the changes in corporate governance practices would be expected to be significantly related to firm 
performance. The governance changes investigated in this study were the board structures. 
 
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure: 
According to the modern theories, agency cost is one of the main components of capital structure and corporate 
governance mechanisms reduce agency problems, therefore both are linked. Claessens et al. (2002) argues that 
good corporate governance mechanisms help firms through better access to financing and lower cost of capital. 
 
The boards of directors are responsible for managing the overall firm and firm operations. They play a vital role 
in deciding about the financial mix. A significant relationship is found between capital structure and board size 
by Pfeffer and Salancick (1978). Berger et al. (1997) found that large boards of directors have low leverage 
levels and larger boards also exert pressure to enhance firm performance. On the other side, Jensen (1986) states 
that high leverage levels have large boards. Wen et al. (2002) found positive relationship between capital 
structure and board size. And large board size is associated with higher debt levels. Abor (2007) found a positive 
correlation between board size and capital structure. 
 
(Rehman, Ramiz and Rehman, Muhammad Ateeq and Raoof, Awais, 2010) investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and capital structure of randomly selected 19 banks of Pakistan. The data was collected 
from financial statements issued by financial institution and multiple regression models were applied to find the 
relationship between the variables. Results show that there is no relationship between corporate governance and 
capital structure in the banking sector of Pakistan. Furthermore, their findings show that all independent 
variables are positively related with capital structure except ownership concentration which affects adversely to 
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capital structure but overall there is an insignificant relationship between capital structure and corporate 
governance. 
 
Non-executive directors are essential part of modern corporate governance mechanisms. Pfeffer and Salancick 
(1978) states that presence of non-executive directors reduces uncertainties about the company and help in 
raising capital. And presence of higher numbers of non-executive directors lead to higher leverage levels. Jensen 
(1986) and Berger et al. (1997) also found the same, those companies having high leverage levels have relatively 
more external directors. Abor (2007) concluded that there is a positive correlation between board composition 
and capital structure. On the other side, Wen et al. (2002) concluded that a significant negative relationship 
between leverage levels and number of external directors. And that the presence of external directors leads to 
low leverage levels. 
(Kumar, Jayesh, 2006) examines the relationship between corporate firm’s ownership and capital structure in 
context of an emerging market economy, India. He used firm-level time series data of listed companies from 
1994 through 2000 and analyzes the firm’s corporate financing behavior in connection with its corporate 
governance arrangements, specially its shareholding pattern. Their results show that the debt structure is non-
linearly linked to the corporate governance (ownership structure). They find that firms with weaker corporate 
governance mechanisms, dispersed shareholding pattern, in particular measured by the entrenchment effects of 
group affiliation, tend to have a higher debt level. Firms with higher foreign ownership or with low institutional 
ownership tend to have lower debt level. They do not find any significant relationship between ownership of 
directors and corporate with the capital structure. 
 
CEO/Chair duality is also one of the important features of corporate governance. This can directly affect the 
capital structure decisions of the company. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that role of CEO and chairman should 
be separate, as CEO is the chief decision management authority and chairman is the chief decision control 
authority. Fosberg (2004) found that separate CEO and chairman have higher leverage levels and results in 
optimal amount of debt. Abor (2007) concluded that there is a positive correlation between CEO duality and 
capital structure. 
 
Abor, Joshua and Biekpe and Nicholas(2007) explore the link between corporate governance and the capital 
structure decision of SMEs. The results show negative association between capital structure and board size. 
Positive relationships between capital structure and board composition, board skills and CEO duality are, 
however, found. The control variables in the model show signs which are consistent with standard capital 
structure theories. The results generally suggest that SMEs pursue lower debt policy with larger board size. 
Interestingly, SMEs with higher percentage of outside directors, highly qualified board members and one-tier 
board system rather employ more debt. It is clear, from the study, that corporate governance structures influence 
the financing decisions of Ghanaian SMEs. Velnampy (2013) revealed that determinants of cooperate 
governance are not correlated with performance measures and no impact of cooperate governance on 
organizational performance. 
 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: 
Board Size 
There is a view that larger boards are better for firm value because they have a range of expertise to help make 
better decisions, and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate. However, some authors have advocated for 
smaller boards. Jensen (1993) argues that large boards are less effective and are easier for the CEO to control. 
When a board gets too big, it becomes difficult to co-ordinate, encourages free riding and poses problems. 
Smaller boards however reduce the possibility of free riding, and increase the accountability of individual 
directors. Hence there will be a positive or negative relationship between board size and firm value. 
 
CEO Duality 
The first issue that the Sri Lankan code required for effective corporate governance was the separation of the top 
two positions of the board (CEO and Chairman). According to Abdullah (2004) the reason for separation is that 
when both the monitoring and the implementation roles are vested in a single person (Combined leadership) the 
monitoring role will be severely impaired. It could also be argued that, when one person is in charge of both 
tasks, favorable decisions are reached faster provided that person is well aware. Alternatively, companies that 
have combined leadership may have an individual who has too much power and able to make decisions that do 
not maximize shareholders wealth (Laing & Weir 1999).  
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Evidence in relation to company performance and board leadership structure is also mixed. Rechner and Dalton 
(1991) found that firms with separate leadership structures outperformed joint structures when measured on 
return on equity return on investment and profit margins, whereas Dalton et al. (1998) found no evidence of a 
relationship between leadership structure and financial performance. According to Abdullah (2004), board 
independence and combined leadership either singly or jointly are not related to performance, because financial 
ratios may not capture the board and leadership roles in establishing a firm’s value, but long-term measures such 
as firms‟ growth and their share price might be useful measures. 
 
Board Composition 
In the code of best practice on corporate governance in Sri Lanka, board composition is also an important 
component of the board structure. The assumption is that an effective board comprised of a greater proportion of 
non-executive directors (Zahra & Pearce 1989), is significant to firm performance. However, the principle A.5 of 
the code of best practice on corporate governance states that it is preferable for the board to have a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the 
board’s decision-taking. Furthermore, Principle A.5.1 states the board should include non-executive directors of 
sufficient caliber and number for their views to carry significant weight in the board’s decisions. The board 
should include at least two non-executive directors or such number of non-executive director’s equivalent to one 
third of total number of directors, whichever is higher (ICASL & SEC of Sri Lanka 2008).  
  
A wide variety of definitions of firm performance have been proposed in the literature (Barney, 2002, Velnampy, 
2005 & 2005, Velnampy and Nimalathasan, 2009, Velnampy and Niresh, 2012, and Velnampy and 
Pratheepkanth, 2012). Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between firm performance and board 
composition is mixed. Some studies find that there is a positive link between the firms‟ performance and its 
composition. Weir and Laing (2001) state that “if non-executive directors resulted in effective monitoring, their 
effectiveness would increase in line with their board representation”. Consistent with the above, Baysinger and 
Butler (1985), found that in 266 US firms with higher numbers of outside directors on the board had a greater 
return on equity than the board with executive directors. Ezzamel and Watson (1993) also found that non-
executive directors were positively associated with profitability among a sample of UK firms. 
 
Frahnaz Ghanbari’s study (2007) investigated the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
performance. The number of non-executive members making up the directors board is considered as an internal 
mechanism and institutional investors as an external mechanism. A sample of 73 enterprises admitted in Tehran 
Exchange Stock participated in the study. The data on the enterprises' activities in years 2003-2005 were 
collected and analyzed, using correlation, regression analysis, and Independent T-test). The findings showed no 
effect of the number of non-executive members making up directors board on the performance. Moreover, there 
is a positive relationship between institutional investors and performance.  
 
Black et al. (2006) concludes that firm’s having higher governance scores have a high market value. Chen (2008) 
suggested that establishing effective governance mechanisms leads to improvement in firm’s value. Harford et 
al. (2008) concluded that poorly governed firm’s destroy firm’s value. 
Mintzberg (1983) and Kosnik (1990) argue that large board size negatively influences performance of firms. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that larger board size turns less effective because of poorer 
communication and decision making process. Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) argue that increasing the 
number of directors increase expertise, knowledge and skills than smaller boards. A high negative relationship 
between performance of firm and board size was found by De Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005). Analysis by 
Dalton and Dalton (2005) found that superior performance resulted from larger 
boards while Bhagat and Black (1999) and Hermalin and Wiesbach (2003) proposed an opposite view. 
 
Brown and Caylor (2006) showed firms with board size in between 6 and 15 yield higher returns on equity. 
Jackling and Johl (2009) found that large board size impacts performance positively. 
 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) found that board with more outside directors performed better than other firms. 
Fosberg (1989) found no relationship between proportion of outside directors and firm’s performance. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found that there is slight increase in stock prices when more outside directors are 
appointed by firms. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found no relationship between board composition and firm 
value. Yermack (1996) showed that proportion of non-executive directors does not affect performance of firm 
significantly. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) while conducting a study on US firms found negative relationship 
between proportion of outside directors and performance of firms. 
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Shrader et al. (1997) found negative relationship between proportion of women on board and firm’s value. 
Bhagat and Black (1999) found no significant between board independence and firm’s performance in a long run 
in case of US firms. Roberts et al. (2005) suggests that the active participation of an independent director brings 
to team, independent ideas. And can be helpful in better functioning the organization and board. In support of the 
above assumption, Brown and Caylor (2006) found that firms with more independent directors performed well 
than others with higher ROE, greater profits, more dividends and higher repurchase of stock. And the most 
important factor in the above study affecting firm’s performance was independence of directors. Chan and Li 
(2008) found that firm value in enhanced by presence ofexpert-independent directors in board. Jackling and Johl 
(2009) found that large number of independent oroutside directors on board impacts performance positively. 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms with CEO duality performed better. Daily and Dalton (1992), while 
conducting a study on entrepreneurial firms, found no relationship between CEO duality and performance of 
firms. Peel and O’Donnell (1995) showed that splitting both roles lead to improved performance. Yermack 
(1996) argued that those firms are more valuable which have separate CEO and chairman position. Brickley et 
al. (1997) concluded that CEO duality doesn’t leads to inferior performance. 
 
Sanda et al. (2003) also found a positive relationship between separate CEO and chairman positions and firm’s 
performance. Brown and Caylor (2006) also concluded the same that when CEO and chairman positions are 
separate, firms are more valuable. Kang and Zardkoohi (2005) concluded regarding studies of the relationship 
between CEO/Chair duality and other measures that the results are complex. They proposed that if such duality 
exists as a reward, it might result in positive performance. But if the reason is to increase the CEO’s power than 
it may have a negative effect on the performance of the firm.  
 
Elsayed (2007) concluded that CEO duality has no effect on performance. But it varies from industry to industry. 
Uzun et al. (2004) found that higher audit committee independence resulted in a lower chance of fraud. So, audit 
committee reduces agency cost and improves overall performance. Brown and Caylor (2006) found positive 
relationship between dividend yield and independent audit committees. But found no relationship between 
independent audit committee and performance. Chan and Li (2008) found that firm value in enhanced by 
presence of expert-independent directors in audit committee. 
 
Lybaert (1998) stated that better performance of firms is due to higher and better level of education among 
entrepreneurs. On the other side, Powel (1991) stated that occupational and professional affiliations of qualified 
managers with firms may have a negative effect. Lawrie (1998) stated that the gaps in management expertise are 
considered less as a barrier in development of SME. What happens at meetings of board and how many directors 
attend those meetings tells shareholders, how seriously the governance responsibilities are met. According to 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), more meetings of board results in improved performance. A positive association 
exists between frequency of meetings and performance of firm and also in between the attendance of directors 
and performance of firm (Brown and Caylor, 2006). 
 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance and Capital Structure: 
Hayat M. Awan, Khuram Shahzad Bukahri & Rameez Mahmood Ansari (2010) find the relationship between 
corporate governance and capital structure and corporate governance and firm performance in Pakistani Textile 
sector. 100 manufacturing companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and Lahore Stock Exchange 
(LSE) from Textile sector are included in sample. Data on Corporate Governance internal mechanisms is 
collected through self-administrated survey, interviews etc. Data related to financial part of the study is collected 
from Annual Reports and time horizon of the data is from 2005 to 2009. Regression Analysis and Structural 
Equation Modelingare used to determine the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure and 
corporategovernance and firm performance. Corporate Governance is measured by fourteen internal governance 
mechanisms.Debt Ratio is used as measure of Capital Structure and Return on Assets is used as measure of 
performance of the firm. Results indicate that Corporate Governance Mechanisms taken together impact Debt 
Ratio negatively and Return on Assets positively. 
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CONCEPTUALIZATION: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Author Constructed 
HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY: 
The hypotheses below are operationalized as a basis for analysis and conclusion on the relationship among 
corporate governance practices, capital structure and profitability of the firm. 
H1: There is a significant relationship between corporate governance practice and profitability. 
H0: There is no significant relationship between corporate governance practices and profitability. 
 
H2: There is a significant relationship between corporate governance practice and capital structure. 
H0: There is no significant relationship between corporate governance practice and capital structure. 
 
H3: There is an impact of corporate governance practices on profitability. 
H0: There is no impact of corporate governance practices on profitability. 
 
H4: There is an impact of corporate governance practices on capital structure 
H0: There is no impact of corporate governance practices on capital structure. 
 
Hypothesis one & two are evaluated based on the correlation analysis while regression analysis the basis of 
evaluation of hypothesis two & three. 
 
METHODOLOGY: 
DATA SOURCE: 
The present study used secondary data for the analysis. The data utilized in this study is extracted from the 
comprehensive income statements and financial position of the sample hotels and restaurant companies quoted in 
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) database. In addition to this, scholarly articles from academic journals and 
relevant text books were also used. 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Board Size 
Board -
Composition 
CEO Duality 
CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
Debt-to-Equity 
Debt Ratio 
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Return on Equity 
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SAMPLING DESIGN: 
Sampling design is a definite plan for obtaining a sample from a given population. It refers to the technique or 
the procedure the researcher would adopt on selecting items for the sample (Kothari, C.R., 2004). The sample of 
this study is confined to the trading sector consists of 08 trading companies listed in the Colombo Stock 
Exchange (CSE). 
 
MODE OF ANALYSIS: 
In the present study, we analyze our data by employing correlation & multiple regressions analysis. For the 
study, entire analysis is done by personal computer. A well-known statistical package like ‘Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences’ (SPSS) 16.0 Version was used in order to analyze the   data. The following liquidity and 
profitability ratios are taken into accounts which are given below. 
 
Table-1: Calculations of Dependent and Independent Variables. 
 Corporate Governance Practices 
Board Size Total number of board of directors. 
Board Composition Dividing number of independent or non-executive directors 
by total number of board of directors. 
CEO Duality 1 if CEO is chairman as well and 0 if otherwise. 
Profitability Ratios 
Return on Equity = Profit after Interest and Tax / Equity Capital X100 
Return on Assets = Profit after Interest and Tax / Total Assets X100 
Capital Structure Ratios 
Debt-to-Equity = Debt Capital / Equity Capital X100 
Debt Ratio = Debt Capital / Total Assets X100 
 
Multiple regression analysis was performed to investigate the impact of corporate governance practices on 
capital structure and profitability which the models used for the study is given below. 
 
Profitability = f (BS; BC; and CEOD) 
Capital Structure = f (BS; BC; and CEOD) 
 
It is important to note that the Profitability and capital structure depend upon Board Size (BS); Board 
Composition (BC) & CEO Duality (CEOD). The following models are formulated in the study. 
 
ROE = β0 + β1BS +β2BC +β3CEOD +e ---------------------------------------- (1) 
ROA = β0 +β1BS +β2BC +β3CEOD +e ----------------------------------------- (2) 
D/E = β0 + β1BS +β2BC +β3CEOD +e ----------------------------------------- (3) 
DR =β0 +β1BS +β2BC +β3CEOD +e ------------------------------------------ (4) 
 
Where,  
β0, β1, β2, β3 are the regression co-efficient 
ROE  Return on Equity 
ROA   Return on Assets 
D/E Debt-to-Equity 
D/R Debt Ratio 
BS  Board Size 
BC  Board Composition 
CEOD  CEO Duality 
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RESULTS & ANALYSIS: 
CORRELATION REGRESSION AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: 
Table 2: Correlation, Regression & Reliability Value 
 
The above mentioned table indicates the relationship between the various independent and dependent variables 
used in the study. As it is observed in the table, the correlation values were found to be mixed (both positive and 
negative) between the variables. The correlation values indicate that there are no relationships between corporate 
governance variables such as board structure, board committee, and CEO duality and profitability variables 
(ROE, and ROA) as well as capital structure ratios namely Debt-equity ratio and Debt-total fund ratio... 
 
REGRESSION:  
Regression analysis is used to test the impact of corporate governance practices on capital structure and 
profitability of the listed hotel and restaurant companies in CSE. As we mentioned in mode of analysis, four 
models were formulated and the results are summarized in the above Table-2. 
The specification of the three variables such as BS; BC and CEOD in the above model revealed the ability to 
predict profitability (R2 = -0.125,0.092,-0.145 & -0.122 ). In this model R2  value of above two profitability 
measures and two capital structure measures denote that 12.5%,9.2%,14.5% &12.2% to the observed variability 
in can be explained by the differences in three  independent variability namely Board Size; Board Composition 
and CEO Duality. The remaining 87.5%, 90.8%,75.5% & 87.8% are not explained, because the remaining part 
of the variance in profitability and capital structure is related to other variables which are not depicted in the 
model.  
 
An examination of the model summary in conjunction with ANOVA (F–value) indicates that the model explains 
the most possible combination of predictor variables that could contribute to the relationship with the dependent 
variables. All model 1, model 2, model 3 and model 4 are not significance in this study. However, it should be 
noted here that there may be some other variables which can have an significant impact on profitability and 
capital structure, which need to be studied. In addition to the above analysis Durbin-Watson test also carried out 
to check the auto correlation among the independent variables. The Durbin-Watson statistic ranges in value from 
0 to 4. A value near 2 indicates non-autocorrelation Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 have the value is 1.922, 1.507, 1.817 and 
2.242 respectively. This indicates that there is no auto correlation. 
 
  
Model Dependent Independent r P – value R2 F-Value Durbin-Watson  
 
1 
 
ROE 
BS 
BC 
CEOD 
0.143 
0.102 
0.162 
0.572 
0.687 
0.522 
 
0.125 
 
0.372 
(0.775) 
 
1.922 
 
2 
 
ROA 
BS 
BC 
CEOD 
0.308 
0.260 
0.269 
0.213 
0.298 
0.280 
 
0.092 
 
 
1.575 
(0.240) 
 
1.507 
3 D/E BS 
BC 
CEOD 
0.167 
0.171 
0.106 
0.509 
0.498 
0.674 
-0.145 0.284 
(0.836) 
1.817 
4 DR BS 
BC 
CEOD 
-0.259 
-0.173 
0.156 
0.299 
0.494 
0.538 
-0.122 0.384 
(0.766) 
2.242 
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HYPOTHESES TESTING: 
Table 3: Testing of Hypotheses 
No Hypotheses Results Tools 
H0 There is no significant relationship between corporate governance 
practices and profitability. 
Accepted Correlation 
H1 There is significant relationship between corporate governance 
practices and profitability. 
Rejected Correlation 
H0 There is no significant relationship between corporate governance 
practices and capital structure. 
Accepted Correlation 
H2 There is significant relationship between corporate governance 
practices and capital structure. 
Rejected Correlation 
H0 There is nosignificant impact of corporate governance practices on 
profitability. 
Accepted Regression 
H1 There issignificant impact of corporate governance practices on 
profitability. 
Rejected Regression 
H0 There is no significant impact of corporate governance practices on 
capital structure. 
Accepted Regression 
H2 There is significant impact of corporate governance practices on capital 
structure. 
Rejected Regression 
 
CONCLUSION: 
'Capital structure decisions' is one of most fundamental issues managers of firms have to face. Based on the new 
theories of capital structure, such decisionscan be affected by different factors, one of which is Corporate 
Governance. Whereas maximizing shareholders’ wealth also another important issues in this context. Therefore, 
in the present study, eight hypotheses were used to test the relationship betweenpractices of Corporate 
Governance and firms' capital structure andpractices of Corporate Governance and firms' profitability.  In each 
of these hypotheses, debt ratio ad debt-to equity ratio (the criterion for capital structure) and return on equity and 
return on assets (the scale of profitability) were used as dependentvariable; however, 'Board Size’, 'Board 
Composition' and 'CEO duality’ were utilized as independent variables.The results obtained from testing the 
research hypotheses indicate that there is a mixrelationship (positive and negative) among corporate governance 
practices, firm profitability and capital structure. 
 
LIMITATIONS &SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 
There are two main limitations identified in this study.Firstly, the sample only covers five years data and an 
external validity problem exists that the results may not be transportable over different time periods and 
locations. Secondly, only three corporate governance variables were considered. Many more variables could be 
considered.sepecially external corporate governance variables have significant impact on firms’ activities. Future 
research should include these types of external factors. 
 
The above study has outlined the internal corporate governance structures and their relationship with capital 
structure and firm performance. It adds to the literature and opens new avenues for future studies, in which both 
internal as well as external corporate governance structures can be taken and then their relationship can be found 
with different proxies of capital structure and firm performance. And due to lack of time and large number of 
firms, only one sector was taken; future studies can incorporate different sectors and can also find differences in 
those sectors related to corporate governance structures and their relationship with capital structure and firm 
performance. 
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